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Abstract
The hypothesis of a hump-shaped relationship between innovation and com-
petition due to Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005), has
been tested for different data sets without garnering conclusive support. In
this paper we argue that this lack of agreement is because of a difference in
approaches to measuring innovation (either in terms of R&D outcomes or
by R&D effort). We develop a unified tractable general-equilibrium frame-
work, in which, while R&D outcomes are a hump-shaped function of com-
petition, R&D effort can be observed to be either increasing, decreasing,
or hump-shaped. This enables our paper, first, to reconcile the conclusions
by Aghion et al. (2005) with more recent results and, second, to inform
further attempts to identify the hump-shaped relationship in data.
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 1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The nature of the relationship between competition and innovation has
been in a focus of economic research since the seminal work of Schumpeter (1943),
who argued that competition has a detrimental impact on incentives to innovate,
as it reduces innovators’ profits.1 To reconcile Schumpeter’s conjecture with con-
trary empirical evidence,2 Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005)
developed and tested empirically the theory of a hump-shaped (inverse-U) rela-
tionship between the two variables.
The understanding of a relationship between competition and innovation
is confounded, however, by the fact that the theory due to Aghion et al. (2005)
has not received conclusive support from other empirical studies. Tingvall and
Poldahl (2006) show the relationship between competition and innovation to be
negative (and thereby the hump-shaped pattern to be absent) in a dataset of
Swedish firms when competition is proxied by the Lerner index;3 Askenazy, Cahn,
and Irac (2013), using a panel of French firms, demonstrated that the relationship
is inverse.4
This paper argues that the inconsistency between the conclusions by Aghion
et al. (2005) on one hand, and Tingvall and Poldahl (2006) and Askenazy et al.
(2013) on the other, is due to the difference in the papers’ approaches to meas-
uring innovation. In particular, while the empirical conclusions in Aghion et al.
(2005) are based on proxying innovation by flows of patents (which is R&D out-
1This idea is reflected in the classic industrial organisation models of product differentiation
due to Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Salop (1979), and the first-generation models of endogenous
growth (e.g., Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992)).
2See, e.g., Nickell (1996), Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen (1999).
3The hump-shaped pattern is present in the results by Tingvall and Poldahl (2006) for
competition’s being proxied by the Herfindahl index, but this conclusion is sensitive with respect
to the econometric techniques employed
4Askenazy et al. (2013) show that the relationship becomes hump-shaped for a subsample
of large firms.
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 come (R&D accomplishment)5), the other two papers measure innovation by R&D
spending (i.e. R&D effort).
We introduce a unifying theoretical framework for the contradictory results
by Aghion et al. (2005), Tingvall and Poldahl (2006) and Askenazy et al. (2013),
which allows R&D effort and R&D spending to behave differently as functions
of competition. In addition to bringing together the aforementioned papers’ con-
clusions, stressing the distinction between the behaviour of R&D effort and R&D
has the merit of bringing further methodological awareness (with regards to ap-
proaches to proxying innovation) to the efforts to confirm the hypothesis of the
hump-shaped relationship between competition and innovation.
1.2 Description of the Framework
In our model, R&D accomplishment does not necessarily have to be an in-
creasing function of R&D effort, and, in particular, can retain its hump-shapedness
even when R&D effort becomes observably monotone. This result is achieved by
constructing a tractable general equilibrium model in which the final consumable
good is produced using a multitude of intermediate inputs produced in imper-
fectly competitive industries, each of which is populated by a mass of homo-
geneous Cournot-competing firms engaging simultaneously in R&D in order to
incrementally increase their total factor productivity. We show that even if each
firm’s R&D effort is not a hump-shaped function of competition (in the case of
our model, it can be an increasing, or a decreasing, or a hump-shaped function of
competition), the relationship between competition and ensuing R&D outcomes
can still exhibit the hump-shaped pattern.
The hump-shaped pattern in R&D outcomes in our model obtains as a
result of interaction between two forces: the escape-costs effect and the depletion
(‘fishing-out’) effect. The former is prompted by the upward pressure of compet-
ition (which we proxy with the number of firms per industry) on firms’ effective
marginal costs, which induces them to invest more in R&D to counteract this
increase, and higher R&D effort leads to better R&D outcomes. On the other
5The latter term is used by Griliches (1998).
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 hand, we assume the aggregate industry level of R&D effort to have a negative
impact on individual R&D outcomes:6 in our model R&D effort is exerted simul-
taneously by all firms in every industry, and ‘. . . when many firms are undertaking
R&D, . . . they are likely to try similar ideas; thus there will be some amount of
external diminishing returns’, – put differently, in the situation of simultaneous
engagement in R&D firms are ‘fishing out of the same pond’ (Acemoglu, 2009,
p. 473).7
In our framework, R&D effort is a hump-shaped function of competition
as well, but can potentially be observed as a monotonic function because of the
following logic. By contrast with R&D outcomes, R&D effort is affected not by
two, but by four forces: two direct (the escape-costs effect and division effect8)
and two indirect (the indirect escape-costs effect and indirect depletion effect).9
Thus, since the two aspects of innovation, as functions of competition, are affected
by different sets of forces, their turning points do not have to coincide. If, in
addition, the measure of competition can take values from a limited interval,
and R&D effort’s turning point is outside this interval (whereas that of R&D
outcomes is within it), then R&D effort and R&D outcomes will be observed as,
respectively, a monotonic and a hump-shaped function, thus producing a situation
of discrepancy in their behaviour.
6Note that the negative impact of aggregate R&D on individual R&D outcomes does not
rule out the possibility of knowledge spillovers: while those imply the presence of intertemporal
dimension (i.e., benefiting from someone else’s previous research), our setting describes firms’
conducting R&D simultaneously, which results in duplication of their effort.
7The logic of this assumption follows the one employed in the premises of the model in
(Acemoglu, 2009, Sec. 14.3) and further generalised in Acemoglu and Cao (2015).
8The division effect inhibits R&D effort and arises from the fact that, as the number of
firms per industry increases, each one of them can attract a smaller share of the economy’s
resources, thus diminishing each firm’s scale of production, which acts as the base over which
costs of R&D are spread (the R&D cost-spreading effect, as introduced and termed in Cohen
and Klepper (1996)).
9The two indirect effects emanate from R&D outcomes, which themselves linearly enter a
firm’s output function, which in turn is linearly related to R&D effort (i.e., the indirect effects
shape R&D effort through R&D outcomes).
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 1.3 Related Literature
Our paper is related to several branches of literature. First and foremost,
similarly to Aghion et al. (2005), d’Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira, and Gérard-
Varet (2010), Askenazy et al. (2013), Onori (2015), we study the phenomenon of
a hump-shaped relationship between competition and innovation in the context
of a general equilibrium model.
We contribute to this body of literature by stressing the difference in the
behaviour of R&D effort and R&D outcomes with regards to competition in-
tensity, through demonstrating that the latter can be a hump-shaped function
of competition even though the former is not – a distinction that is not made in
any of the aforementioned papers, which prevents them from accommodating the
inconsistency of the results by Aghion et al. (2005) on one hand, and Tingvall
and Poldahl (2006) and Askenazy et al. (2013) on the other. In addition, in our
model we suggest a novel mechanism producing the hump-shaped pattern, which
comprises the superposition of the costs-escape effect and the depletion effect, as
well as the division effect – in the case of R&D effort.
Our paper is also related to a few other strands of research. First of all,
by highlighting the differences between the behaviour of R&D effort and that
of R&D outcomes on the theoretical level, our model is related to the works by
Link (1980) and Pohlmeier (1992), where those differences are underscored in the
context of empirical IO studies.
Furthermore, our model can be thought of as a general-equilibrium gen-
eralisation of the stylised model by Cohen and Klepper (1996), which allows it,
similarly to the authors’ model, to match a number of stylised regularities of
R&D, including:
1. R&D expenditure increases in a firm’s output size (Cohen and Klepper,
1996, Stylised fact 2, p. 928);
2. The elasticity of R&D expenditure with respect to the volume of a firm’s
output is unity (Cohen and Klepper, 1996, Stylised fact 3, p. 929);
3. R&D productivity (defined as the ratio of R&D accomplishment to R&D
effort) decreases with a firm’s size (Cohen and Klepper, 1996, Stylised fact 4,
4
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 p. 930): in our model, the resulting increase in productivity is independent
of the firm’s output, whereas R&D effort is linear in the latter, so that in
the long-run their ratio diminishes to zero.
1.4 Structure of the Paper
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 the model
is presented and solved: Sections 2.1 and 2.2 introduce the model’s equations;
in Section 2.3 we describe the equilibrium conditions in intermediate-good mar-
kets, solve for firms’ optimal decisions on production and R&D investment, and
establish the conditions under which the hump-shaped patterns in R&D effort
and R&D accomplishment emerge; Section 2.4 enquires into the behaviour of
the aggregate household to pin down the economy’s behaviour in the long-run.
Section 3 is devoted to investigating the conditions under which the situations
of discrepancy in the behaviour of R&D effort and R&D outcomes occur, and
checking the empirical compatibility of the model’s predictions. In particular,
given that our results depend crucially on the value of the elasticity of substitu-
tion between inputs, we start with assessing the range of its values compatible
with our model’s setting (Section 3.1), after which we proceed to deriving the
discrepancy conditions in Section 3.2 and discussing their empirical plausibility
in Section 3.3. The last section concludes.
2 The Model
From a mathematical standpoint, our paper’s key intuition is as follows.
Suppose that R&D effort γ is a function g(m;χ) of competition (as measured
by some parameter m ∈ [m
¯
; m¯]) and a set of other parameters χ. The standard
logic, which implicitly underlies the shift from R&D outcomes to R&D effort
in Tingvall and Poldahl (2006) and Askenazy et al. (2013), suggests that if q
stands for R&D outcomes, it is technologically related to γ through an increasing
function R(γ; θ) (where θ are other affecting parameters). Thus, the signs of m’s
effects on q ( ∂q
∂m
= ∂R
∂γ
· ∂g
∂m
) and on γ ( ∂γ
∂m
= ∂g
∂m
) have to coincide, which allows
one to treat γ and q equivalently. By contrast, R&D outcomes in our model are
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 related to R&D effort via function R′(γ;m; θ), which increases in γ and directly
depends on competition. In this case, the signs of competition’s effects on the
two aspects of innovation are determined by expressions: ∂q
∂m
= ∂R
′
∂γ
· ∂g
∂m
+ ∂R
′
∂m
>
< 0
and ∂γ
∂m
= ∂g
∂m
>
< 0, and no longer have to coincide. In particular, when
∂γ
∂m
maintains the same sign for any m ∈ [m
¯
; m¯], whereas that of ∂q
∂m
changes from
positive to negative at some point “mq ∈ [m
¯
; m¯], a situation of discrepancy in the
observed behaviour of γ and q occurs.10 In this section, we present the above
logic through a richer, micro-founded model, whose conclusions lend themselves
to quantitative assessment (see Section 3.3).
The model describes an economy where the final good is produced compet-
itively using inputs supplied by industries populated by homogeneous Cournot-
competitive firms. Each firm engages in production and R&D (which leads to
a decrease in a firm’s marginal costs). Both R&D effort (R&D spending in the
model) and R&D outcomes (a drop in marginal costs) are shown to be hump-
shaped functions of competition in an industry, whose peaks do not generally
coincide. This can bring about a situation of discrepancy in the observed beha-
viour of R&D effort and R&D outcomes, exact conditions for which are formally
investigated in Section 3.
2.1 Aggregate Production
Suppose that final output is produced competitively with the CES techno-
logy using intermediate inputs provided by the unit mass of identical industries
Y (t) =
 1∫
0
y(i; t)
ξ−1
ξ di

ξ
ξ−1
= y(t) (1)
y(i; t) = y(t) is the i-th industry’s output at t, and ξ > 0 is the elasticity of
substitution between inputs. The second expression is implied by industries’
homogeneity. We assume the final good to be the numeraire.
Each industry is populated bym(i) = m homogeneous Cournot-competing
10The author wishes to thank David Ulph for this interpretation.
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 firms,11 so that an industry’s output equals
y(i; t) =
m(i)∫
0
y˜(i; j; t) dj = my˜(t) (2)
Throughout the paper, we use tildes to denote firm-specific variables.
In what follows, we use m as a measure of competition (similarly to Onori
(2015)): although the number of firms in an industry is not among standard meas-
ures of competition, the model’s m maps monotonically into those – in particular,
the Herfindahl12 and Lerner13 indices.14 Since we are interested in investigating
the relationship between competition and different aspects of R&D, we consider
the latter in a strictly oligopolistic environment, so that m > m
¯
≡ 2 through-
out the paper, similarly to existing theoretical literature (Aghion et al. (2005),
d’Aspremont et al. (2010), Askenazy et al. (2013), Onori (2015)).
2.2 Individual Firms
Each firm seeks to maximise its profits by choosing the volume of output
and the amount of R&D effort γ˜(i; j; t) = γ˜(t)
p˜i(i; j; t) =
(
p(i; t)− ψ˜(i; j; t)
)
y˜(i; j; t)− γ˜(i; j; t) (3)
11The main reason we use the Cournot-competition mechanism in our model is because
it establishes a negative relationship between the number of firms per industry m and their
mark-ups (see (12) and the following discussion), which in turn gives rise to the escape-costs
effect introduced below. Alternatively, one could use a more direct approach suggested in Galí
(1994) and Galí (1995), and later used in Comin and Gertler (2006), wherein the elasticity of
substitution ξ(m) is posited to be an increasing function of the number of firms (in particular,
Comin and Gertler (2006) use the following functional form: ξ(m) = 1+Dm
χ
Dmχ , so that the mark-
up is a constant elasticity function of m: µ(m) = Dmχ).
12The Herfindahl index is calculated as IH =
∑m
i=1 δ
2
i , where δi is the market share of the
i-th firm. Since all firms are homogeneous, the model’s Herfindahl index equals 1m .
13A firm’s Lerner index equals IL = p−ψp (the notations are taken from the model). As
follows from equation (12), the model’s Lerner index for each firm equals 1ξm .
14For a detailed discussion, see (Martin, 2002, pp. 335–338) and references cited therein.
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 where ψ˜(i; j; t) is the average/marginal cost of producing the i-th intermediate
good by the j-th firm.15
A firm produces its output using a Cobb-Douglas technology of unitary
homogeneity by employing capital (k˜(i; j; t)) and labour (l˜(i; j; t)), both provided
by the economy’s households in competitive markets
y˜(i; j; t) = q˜(i; j; t)Q(t)F
(
k˜(i; j; t) ; l˜(i; j; t)
)
=
= q˜(i; j; t)Q(t) k˜(i; j; t) ν l˜(i; j; t) 1−ν
(4)
whereQ(t) is the economy-wide total factor productivity (TFP) level, and q˜(i; j; t)
is its increase for the j-th firm, generated by its individual R&D effort by means
of the following technology
q˜(i; j0; t) = η
 γ˜(i; j0; t)
Q(t)F
(
k˜(i; j; t) ; l˜(i; j; t)
)
α×
×
 m(i)∫
0
γ˜(i; j; t)
Q(t)F
(
k˜(i; j; t) ; l˜(i; j; t)
)dj
−β ,
α > β > 0
(5)
q˜(t) = ηm−β
 γ˜(t)
Q(t)F
(
K(t)
Nm
; L(t)
Nm
)
α−β (6)
where α and −β are, respectively, the elasticity of q˜ with respect to a firm’s
own R&D effort, and the elasticity of q˜ with respect to aggregate R&D effort in
the industry. In what follows, we interpret q˜(i; j; t) as the R&D outcome being
brought about by R&D effort γ˜(i; j; t). We assume that firms do not take into
account their impact on aggregate within-industry R&D effort
∫ m(i)
0
γ˜(i; j; t) dj.
Expression (6) is derived from (5) using the homogeneity of firms. Note that (6)
represents a particular form of R′(γ;m; θ) from the stylised model discussed in
the Introduction: q˜(t) = ηγ˜(t) α−βmα−2β (Q(t)F (K(t) ;L(t)))−(α−β).
In order to bound q˜ from below we assume that zero R&D effort does not
affect the current level of productivity, so that the latter’s incremental multi-
15We slightly abuse notation by equating average costs to marginal costs, but this claim is
valid in this instance, since firms in our model use a linearly homogeneous technology.
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 plier q˜(i; j; t) equals one: γ˜(i; j; t) = 0 ⇒ q˜(i; j; t) = 1, i.e. a firm’s productivity
does not change. In what follows, we assume that η is suitably high, so that the
situation when innovation is absent, never occurs.
Dividing every instance of γ˜ by F
(
k˜(i; j; t) ; l˜(i; j; t)
)
in (5) results in q˜’s
being independent of the amount of production factors employed by a firm, which
we motivate by the absence of a statistically significant relationship between the
average amount of production factors employed by a firm, and the TFP growth
rate, as observed in US data (see Figures 6a, 6b, 7).
We follow existing literature (see, e.g., (Acemoglu, 2009, Section 14.3),
Acemoglu and Cao (2015)) in assuming that ideas are fished out: in terms of our
model, β is strictly positive, so that it reflects the inhibiting effect of aggregate
research effort on individual R&D productivity within a firm. Thus, β can be
interpreted as the contamination parameter, which captures the depletion of the
stock of available ideas as those are being searched for simultaneously by a multi-
tude of firms (as put in (Acemoglu, 2009, p. 472), ‘fishing from the same pond’).
Note that, in spite of the contamination component being present in (5), q˜(t) is
still an increasing function of individual research effort γ˜(i; j; t) for every fixed
level of competition m (see (6)), which is achieved by setting α > β.
Similarly to Aghion and Howitt (1992), Howitt (1999), d’Aspremont et al.
(2010), the economy-wide TFP level Q(t) grows as a by-product of the individual
research activity. In particular, we model the growth rate of Q(t) as the logarithm
of the average of individual q˜(i; j; t)-s across the economy
gQ(t) ≡ Q˙(t)
Q(t)
= ln
 1∫
0
m(i)∫
0
q˜(i; j; t)
m(i)
djdi
 = ln (q˜(t)) (7)
We opt for the logarithmic function in (7) primarily because the equation’s cor-
responding discrete-time (i.e., observable) version takes the natural form Qt+1 =(
1
N
∫ N
0
∫ m(i)
0
q˜(i;j;t)
m(i)
djdi
)
Q(t),16 which makes our results comparable to pieces of
empirical evidence used later in the paper (see Section 3.3). Equation (7) com-
pletes the introduction of the model’s production side.
16See footnote 30.
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 2.3 Industry Equilibrium
Before specifying the behaviour of intermediate firms, we will derive the
demand function for an intermediate input from profit maximisation in the the
final-good sector
p(i; t) = p(t) =
∂Y (t)
∂y(i; t)
= Y (t)
1
ξ y(t) −
1
ξ (8)
Since Y (t) is a linear homogeneous function of y(i; t), the Euler theorem can be
brought to bear to obtain the expression: Y (t) =
∫ 1
0
∂Y (t)
∂y(i;t)
y(i; t) di = p(t) y(t).
Combining the last equation with the assumption of firms’ homogeneity pins
down the price of an intermediate good (in terms of the final good’s price)
Y (t) = y(t) = p(t) y(t)⇔
⇔ p(t) = p = 1
(9)
Given the constancy of each intermediate input’s price, we can solve a
firm’s problem. We shall start with rewriting the cost function. Since the pro-
duction function is Cobb-Douglas, a firm’s cost function takes the form17
ψ˜(i; j; t) =
1
q˜(i; j; t)Q(t)
(
R(t)
ν
)ν (
w(t)
1− ν
)1−ν
≡ ψ(t)
q˜(i; j; t)
(10)
where w(t) and R(t) are the factor prices of labour and capital, respectively.
Given (10), the profit function can be rewritten as follows
p˜i(i; j; t) = p(i; t) y˜(i; j; t)− ψ(t)
q˜(i; j; t)
y˜(i; j; t)− γ˜(i; j; t) (11)
Since all firms are homogeneous, maximising (13) with respect to y˜ yields
the standard result for the price charged in each industry
p∗(t) =
ξm
ξm− 1 ·
ψ(t)
q˜(t)
⇔ ψ(t) = ξm− 1
ξm
q˜(t) (12)
where the second expression in (12) follows from (9). Given the first expression
in (12), p∗(t) can be rewritten as p∗(t) = (1 + µ) ψ(t)
q˜(t)
, where µ = 1
ξm−1 is the price
mark-up, whose inverse relationship with the mass of firms in an industry m is
17See (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Greene, 1995, p. 142).
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 an implication of Cournot-competition between firms. Given the functional form
of µ and our premise that m > 2, we restrict ξ to be strictly greater than 1
2
.
Since the factor markets are perfectly competitive, the problem of maxim-
ising p˜i with respect to y˜ is equivalent to maximising it with respect to amounts
of capital and labour employed (without taking into consideration the impact
of k˜(t) and l˜(t) on q˜(t)), which allows one to express the economy’s equilibrium
factor prices
max
y˜
{
p(i; t) y˜(i; j; t)− ψ(t)
q˜(i; j; t)
y˜(i; j; t)− γ˜(i; j; t)
}
⇔ (13)
⇔max
k˜;l˜
{
p(i; t) q˜(i; j; t)Q(t) k˜(i; j; t) ν l˜(i; j; t) 1−ν−
− R(t) k˜(i; j; t)− w(t) l˜(i; j; t)− γ˜(i; j; t)
} (14)
∂p˜i
∂k˜
= 0⇔ R(t) = ξm− 1
ξm
p(t) q˜(t)Q(t)F ′
k˜
(
k˜(t) ; l˜(t)
)
=
= ν
ξm− 1
ξm
N
1
ξ−1 q˜(t)Q(t)
(
L(t)
K(t)
)1−ν
=
ξm− 1
ξm
MPK(t)
(15)
∂p˜i
∂l˜
= 0⇔ w(t) = ξm− 1
ξm
p(t) q˜(t)Q(t)F ′
l˜
(
k˜(t) ; l˜(t)
)
=
= (1− ν) ξm− 1
ξm
N
1
ξ−1 q˜(t)Q(t)
(
K(t)
L(t)
)ν
=
ξm− 1
ξm
MPL(t)
(16)
The term ξm−1
ξm
= 1
1+µ
reflects the distortive impact of monopoly power on factor
prices in the economy: the greater it is (or, put equivalently, the higher oligopol-
ists’ mark-ups are) the more pronounced the deviation of R(t) and w(t) becomes
from the marginal products of capital and labour (MPK(t) and MPL(t), respect-
ively), determining factor prices in a competitive economy.
Turning to characterising firms’ decisions on R&D investment, differenti-
ating (13) with respect to γ˜ leads to the expression
α
y˜(i; j0; t)
γ˜(i; j0; t)
=
q˜(γ˜(i; j0; t))
ψ(t)
⇔ γ˜(i; j0; t) = αy˜(i; j0; t) ψ(t)
q˜(γ˜(i; j0; t))
(17)
γ˜∗(t) = α y˜(t)
ξm− 1
ξm
(18)
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 where expression (18) follows from (9). A noteworthy feature of equation (18) is
that the elasticity of γ˜∗(t) with respect to y˜(t) is unity, which matches a widely
recognised stylised fact on R&D.18 This result can be interpreted along the lines of
reasoning advanced by Cohen and Klepper (1996): as a firm’s output increases,
so does, for two reasons, the total effect of R&D. Firstly, with a larger scale
of production, the costs of R&D can be spread across a larger level of output;
secondly, the drop in production costs resulting from R&D, applies to a larger
number of items produced, thus increasing a firm’s gains, and thereby encouraging
further R&D effort.
Plugging (18) into (6) yields the final expression for q˜∗
q˜∗(t) = q˜∗ = E
(
ξm− 1
ξm
α
α−β
) α−β
1−(α−β)
, E ≡ (αα−βη) 11−(α−β) (19)
Together, equations (15), (16), (18) and (19) pin down the equilibrium
level of profits accruing to a firm
p˜i∗(t) =
µ− α
m
ξm− 1
ξm
q˜∗Q(t)K(t) νL(t) 1−ν =
µ− α
m
ξm− 1
ξm
Y (t) (20)
Note that the optimal solution for p˜i(t) can potentially be negative if
term µ − α is so. This property comes from the fact that R&D effort enters
the profit function in the fixed-cost form. In what follows, we require that the
term be non-negative, which sets the upper bound on the number of firms per
industry
α 6 µ = 1
ξm− 1 ⇔ m 6 m¯ =
1 + α
αξ
(21)
As the final step in deriving a firm’s optimal solution, combining (18)
and (19) allows one to express γ˜∗(t) as a function of the economy’s production
factors. By plugging (19) into (18) and using y˜(t) = q˜(t)Q(t)
m
F (K(t) ;L(t)), we
have
γ˜∗(t) = αE
(
ξm− 1
ξm2−α+2β
) 1
1−(α−β)
Q(t)F (K(t) ;L(t)) (22)
18See (Cohen and Klepper, 1996, p. 929).
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 One can show that both q˜∗ and γ˜∗(t) (once the dynamics of Q(t), K(t)
and L(t) is controlled for)19 may be related to the degree of competition in the
hump-shaped fashion – the following Observations specify the conditions under
which this obtains.
Observation 2.3.1. Let “mq = αβξ and α < 1+β. Then q˜
∗ is increasing ∀m < “mq
and is decreasing otherwise, so that “mq is q˜∗(t)’s global maximum. Therefore,
when α > 2βξ ⇔ “mq > 2 and “mq < m¯, the hump-shaped pattern in the relation-
ship between competition and innovation outcomes becomes observable.
Proof. Follows from calculating dq˜
dm
and applying the method of intervals. 
The hump-shapedness of q˜∗ is achieved through the superposition of two
forces: on one hand, if we assume for a moment that β = 0, q˜∗ becomes an
increasing function of the mass of firms in an industry: as follows from (9), each
industry’s price is fixed, which, together with a firm’s pricing rule (12), has the
general-equilibrium implication that firms’ effective marginal costs ψ(t)
q˜∗ increase
in the degree of competition, which prompts them to invest more in R&D as an
attempt to drive effective costs down through increasing their productivity (the
escape-costs effect).20 Finally, greater R&D effort translates into better R&D
outcomes. On the other hand, the effect’s impact is counteracted by the ‘fishing-
out’ effect discussed above. As suggested by Observation 2.3.1, the escape-costs
effect prevails for lower values of m (below “mq), whereas the opposite is true
for m > “mq.
Note that, as suggested by the formula for “mq, the relative strength of the
escape-costs effect decreases in the elasticity of substitution ξ: if it is low, then
the mark-up wedge µ between costs and prices is further from zero, and hence
an increase in m has a greater impact on µ, prompting firms to invest more in
19Controlling for industry-specific and time-specific effects is a standard feature of empirical
analyses in the field – see Aghion et al. (2005), Tingvall and Poldahl (2006), Askenazy et al.
(2013).
20Naturally, greater costs create stronger incentives to innovate in our model: if, for the sake
of the argument, a firm’s costs amount to £100, then doubling its productivity level reduces
effective costs by £50. By contrast, if the costs’ level is £2, then the impact a two-fold increase
in q˜ saves a firm only £1 per unit of output.
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 R&D. In addition, rather naturally, the markedness of the hump-shaped pattern
increases in α, since higher productivity of innovation induces more R&D effort.
Observation 2.3.2. Let “mγ = 2−α+2β1−α+2β
1
ξ
. If α < 1 + 2β, then γ˜∗(t) is increas-
ing ∀m < “mγ and is decreasing otherwise, so that “mγ is γ˜∗(t)’s global max-
imum. Therefore, when 2 < “mγ < m¯, the hump-shaped pattern in the relation-
ship between competition and innovation effort becomes observable. Otherwise
when α > 1 + 2β, γ˜∗(t) is an increasing function of m.
Proof. Follows from calculating dγ˜
∗(t)
dm
and applying the method of intervals. 
In the case of the hump-shaped pattern in R&D effort, the escape-costs
effect is present in γ˜∗(t) both directly, as reflected by term ψ(t)
q˜
in (17) (and
equivalently, term ξm−1
ξm
in (18)) and indirectly, as encapsulated in productivity
term q˜∗ entering y˜(t) = q˜∗F
(
K(t)
m
; L(t)
m
)
. In addition, the presence of q˜∗ also
serves as a channel for the indirect depletion effect, which is further reinforced
by the factors division effect: a larger number of producers m entails that each
one of them can attract a smaller share of the economy’s capital and labour,
which in turn reduces a firm’s scale of production and, by that means, shrinks its
opportunities to spread R&D costs across their output.
Comparing the mechanics of the hump-shaped patterns in γ˜∗(t) and q˜∗
suggests that since in the case of the latter the positive (escape-costs) and negat-
ive (depletion) effect are enhanced (through the indirect escape-costs effect and
a combination of the indirect depletion effect and the factor division effect, re-
spectively), depending on which of them is reinforced more strongly, we may
expect either of the situations “mq > “mγ and “mγ > “mq to occur. This gives rise
to the possibility of the discrepancy in the behaviour of the two functions when
the turning point of one of them is outside the range [m
¯
; m¯]. The situations of
particular interest for us are those when the hump-shapedness in R&D outcomes
is observable, while that in R&D effort is not. We set a detailed discussion of
these conditions aside until Section 3, after we specify the steady-state dynamics
of the model’s economy, for which we turn to enquiring into the behaviour of the
aggregate household.
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 2.4 Representative Household and Long-Run Equilibrium
Moving on to the consumption side of the economy, we model it as the
aggregate household comprising L(t) = L0ent individuals, with a CRRA-type
instantaneous utility function, so that its lifetime utility equals
U =
+∞∫
0
e−ρt
c(t) 1−θ − 1
1− θ L(t) dt (23)
where c(t) is consumption per capita, C(t) = c(t)L(t) is total consumption, and
ρ > n is the consumers’ time-discount factor.
The household’s members are assumed to own together all firms and pro-
duction factors (capital and labour) in the economy, so that their income is com-
posed of firms’ profits p˜i(t)Nm and total factor payments (w(t)L(t) – for labour
and (R(t)− δ)K(t) – for capital, where δ is the rate of capital depreciation).
The household splits its assets between consumption and investment, tak-
ing firms’ profits and factor prices as given, which gives rise to the standard
intertemporal budget constraint
K˙(t) = (R(t)− δ)K(t) + w(t)L(t) + p˜i(t)m− C(t) (24)
Equation (24) can be transformed using (15), (16) and (20)
K˙(t) =
ξm (1− α) + α
ξm
q˜∗Q(t)K(t) νL(t) 1−ν − C(t) (25)
Maximising (23) with respect to (25) constitutes a canonical Ramsey-
Cass-Koopmans dynamic optimisation problem with a Cobb-Douglas production
function and CRRA preferences. Therefore, we can argue that the model exhibits
saddle-path convergence to the unique steady state, in which the economy’s wage
rate and per capita variables (namely output, capital and consumption) grow
at the rate ln q˜
∗
1−ν .
21 In addition, the ratio K(t)
Q(t)
1
1−ν L(t)
equals fixed number kSS
21Naturally, the last conclusion suggests that the economy’s total output, capital and con-
sumption grow in the long-run at the rate of q˜
∗
1−ν + n. Therefore, the growth rates of both
aggregate and per-capita quantities in the economy inherit the hump-shapedness properties
of q˜∗.
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 determined by the steady-state Euler equation22
RSS = νq˜∗
ξm− 1
ξm
(
kSS
)ν−1
= ρ+ δ +
θ ln q˜∗
1− ν (26)
kSS =
νN 1ξ−1 ξm−1ξm q˜∗
ρ+ δ + θ ln q˜
∗
1−ν
 11−ν (27)
Equations (26) and (27) complete specifying the solution of the model by
pinning down its long-run dynamics. In the next section, we turn to investigating
the situations of discrepancy in the shapes of functional relationships between q˜∗
and γ˜∗(t) on one hand, and m on the other.
3 Quantitative Assessment of the Model
Despite the fact that both γ˜∗(t) and q˜∗ are hump-shaped with respect
to the degree of competition m, a situation of discrepancy in the behaviour of
these functions can occur if the maximum point of one of them lies outside the
interval [m
¯
; m¯]. Given the motivation of this paper, we are interested in looking
into the conditions under which q˜∗ is hump-shaped, whereas γ˜∗(t) is not (which,
given that γ˜∗(t) is a hump-shaped function, suggests that it has to be observably
monotone). This can be the case if the turning point of q˜∗ (i.e. “mq) lies within
the interval of m’s permissible values [m
¯
; m¯], while γ˜∗(t) (i.e. “mγ) is outside it,
which is described by either of the two conditions as follows
m
¯
< “mq < m¯ 6 “mγ (28)
“mγ 6 m
¯
< “mq < m¯ (29)
Equations (28) and (29) describe the cases when γ˜∗(t) increases (respect-
ively, decreases) for any m ∈ [m
¯
; m¯], while q˜∗ retains its hump-shapedness (see
22For a detailed derivation and discussion of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model’s properties
see, e.g., (Aghion and Howitt, 1998, Section 1.2), (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, Chapter 2),
(Acemoglu, 2009, Chapter 8).
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 “mq “mγm
¯
m¯
q˜∗
γ˜∗(t)
m
γ˜∗(t), q˜∗
(a) Discrepancy case №1, eq. (28).
“mq“mγ m
¯
m¯
q˜∗
γ˜∗(t)
m
γ˜∗(t), q˜∗
(b) Discrepancy case №2, eq. (29).
Figure 1: The cases of discrepancy in the behaviour of γ˜∗(t) and q˜∗.
Figures 1a and 1b for the illustration). For the sake of brevity, we refer to these
situations as HS-I (hump-shaped, increasing; corresponds to Aghion et al. (2005)
vs. Askenazy et al. (2013)) and HS-D (hump-shaped, decreasing; corresponds
to Aghion et al. (2005) vs. Tingvall and Poldahl (2006)) discrepancies, respect-
ively.23
Given that “mq, m¯, “mγ depend on three parameters (namely α, β, ξ), we
are going to simplify enquiring into conditions (28), (29) by restricting the range
of ξ’s values to those implied by existing literature, and thus concentrating on
mapping out the relationships between α and β, which underlie (28) and (29).
Unfortunately, our task is hampered by the incompatibility of our model (where
each industry is populated with a multitude of firms) with existing estimates in
macro literature (see, e.g. Smets and Wouters (2003), Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005), Primiceri, Schaumburg, and Tambalotti (2006), Broda and
Weinstein (2006), Broda and Weinstein (2010)), where the estimates of ξ are
23Unfortunately, our model cannot account for the fragility of the hump-shaped pattern, as
reported in Tingvall and Poldahl (2006), which comes from the presence of the hump-shaped
pattern when competition is measured by the Herfindahl index – we do not think of it as a
major drawback though, since, first of all, the estimated hump-shaped pattern is itself fragile
with respect to the choice of econometric procedure, as discussed above; secondly, the use of
the Herfindahl index is questioned in, e.g., Aghion et al. (2005) as not reflecting the true size of
a market for exporting firms. For these reasons, we focus on the negative result in Tingvall and
Poldahl (2006), where innovation is negatively related to competition (as measured by PCM).
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 obtained under the assumption of each industry’s being monopolised. This con-
sideration motivates the next section, where we derive, in a stylised fashion, the
ranges of ξ’s values compatible with our model’s setting.
3.1 Preliminary Considerations – the Value of the Elasti-
city of Substitution
Our approach to assessing the value of ξ is akin to the line of argumentation
used in Atkeson and Burstein (2008): we are going to equate the model’s mark-
up µ to mark-up values inferred from existing data and backup ξ from them, for
which, given µ’s functional form, we need to gauge the number of firms in an
industry m first.
We would like to precede the assessment of m with a discussion of what
real-life concepts may match our model’s notion of industry. Clearly, it cannot
be equated to the industry in the sense of a unit in an industrial classification
table: our assumption of Cournot-competition on the intra-industry level implies
that each firm takes into account how its decisions affect the whole industry,
which clearly implies that, while determining the value of m, we need to take
into account the ‘compactness’ of the corresponding group of firms. In the spirit
of the models due to Hotelling (1929) and Salop (1979), we focus on interpreting
this ‘compactness’ in spatial terms, which is why we assess the value of m as the
average number of firms24 per ‘industrial-table’ industry per local economy unit.
The last consideration has led us to using US business data, because (primarily
for the purposes of labour market research) the US territory has been split into
709 the so-called commuting zones,25 which are interpreted as local economy units
(see, e.g., (Killian and Hady, 1988, pp. 3–5), Tolbert and Sizer (1996), (Walden,
2008, Ch. 5)).
In addition, in order to reflect the homogeneity of each industry’s product,
in our evaluation of m we use the number of six-digit NAICS industries, which
24We take the latest available data on the total number of firms (for year 2013) from the
Statistics of US Businesses and Business Dynamics Statistics databases.
25Data source: U.S. Commuting Zones and Labour Market Areas: Documentation.
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 Table 1: The ranges of ξ’s values for a selection of countries
(mark-up estimates from (Oliveira Martins et al., 1996, Tables 1, 2)).
Country
m = 7 m = 10
ξ
¯
ξmed ξ¯ ξ
¯
ξmed ξ¯
France 0.350 0.937 3.714 0.245 0.656 2.6
Sweden 0.475 1.036 2.184 0.333 0.725 1.529
USA 0.407 1.571 4.905 0.285 1.100 3.433
constitute the most detailed level of the US industrial classification and, hence,
are expected to be comprised of the most substitutable products.26 Resorting to
data from the Statistics of US Businesses database yields the total of 978 six-digit
industries.
Depending on whether the figures on the total number of US firms are
taken from the Statistics of US Businesses database or the Business Dynamics
Statistics database,27 the resulting number of firms per model’s industrym equals
either 7 or 10.
We recover the range of ξ’s values by drawing upon the body of literature
on mark-up estimation (see, e.g., Oliveira Martins et al. (1996), Klette (1999),
De Loecker and Warzynski (2012)). In particular, we use mark-up estimates for
samples of industries in France and Sweden from Oliveira Martins et al. (1996),
which, when coupled with the definition of µ, generate the estimates for ξ ranging
from 0.245 to 3.714 (for France) and from 0.333 to 2.184 (for Sweden, see Table 1).
26As an example, mayonnaise and ketchup are likely to be less substitutable than two ketchup
brands. The assumption of higher substitutability is in line with existing evidence – see Broda
and Weinstein (2006), Broda and Weinstein (2010).
27The discrepancy in numbers partly occurs because firms entering the Business Dynamics
Statistics database are those active during the pay period which covers the 12th of March,
whereas firms in the other database are active at some point in a year.
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Figure 2: The hump-shapedness conditions for q˜∗ (for ξ = 1.1).
3.2 Theoretical Considerations
First of all, in the discussion to follow we assume that there are possibilities
for firms to make profits, viz. m
¯
< m¯, or, equivalently
2 <
1 + ξ
αξ
⇔ α < 1
2ξ − 1 (30)
In the case of both HS-D and HS-I discrepancy we require the following
condition to hold: m
¯
< “mq < m¯. Given Observation 2.3.1, this implies the
following system of inequalities
 α > 2βξα
βξ
< 1+α
αξ
⇔
 α > 2βξα2 < βα + β (31)
Note that system (31) implies that for its solution 2 < α
βξ
< – i.e. condition (30)
is satisfied automatically. Solving (31) for α yields the result
α ∈
(
2βξ;
β +
√
β2 + 4β
2
)
(32)
A graphic representation of condition (32) is shown in Figure 2. Naturally, the
range of α’s suitable values is nonempty whenever 2βξ < β+
√
β2+4β
2
, which is the
case when the following condition holds
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Figure 3: The unobserved hump-shapedness conditions for γ˜∗(t) (for ξ = 1.1).
The intersection point and values of β above it correspond to the situation in which
condition (37) is violated.
β <
1
2ξ (2ξ − 1) (33)
Expression (33) imposes the upper limit on the value of ‘fishing-out’ coefficient β,
above which the level of α required to generate a detectable hump-shaped pattern,
exceeds the mark-up. A noteworthy feature of the conditions obtained is that,
since the derivative of the upper limit in (32) increases to infinity for β → 0, a
suitable pair of α (in the interval specified in (32)) and β (satisfying (33)) can
be chosen for any given value of ξ – put differently, for any level of ξ the shaded
area in Figure 2 is nonempty.
Turning to the conditions of observed monotonicity of R&D effort, it is
decreasing in m if the following condition holds
2− α + 2β
1− α + 2β
1
ξ
6 2⇔ α (2ξ − 1) 6 2 (ξ − 1) + 2β (2ξ − 1) (34)
Depending on whether ξ is greater than 1/2 or not, the final condition for α takes
either of two forms: α 6 2(ξ−1)
2ξ−1 + 2β for ξ > 1/2, and α >
2(ξ−1)
2ξ−1 + 2β for ξ < 1/2.
We can omit the second inequality however, as the corresponding value of “mγ
is outside γ˜∗(t)’s domain. Thus, a decreasing pattern in γ˜∗(t) can occur only
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 if ξ > 1/2, and the final expression for the corresponding condition is
α 6 2 (ξ − 1)
2ξ − 1 + 2β, ξ >
1/2 (35)
Naturally, if α is too large (in the sense of (35)), the productiveness of R&D
is sufficiently high to induce further R&D effort and reinforce the escape-costs
effect to the degree when “mγ is pushed further right into interval [m
¯
; m¯], which
makes γ˜∗(t) observably hump-shaped.
An increasing pattern in R&D effort obtains if
2− α + 2β
1− α + 2β
1
ξ
> 1 + α
α
1
ξ
⇔ α− β > 1
2
(36)
Note that unlike all previous conditions, equation (36) imposes a constraint on α
not only in relative, but also in absolute terms: since β > 0, α cannot be smaller
than 1/2. The last consideration, in conjuncture with the stipulation that m
¯
< m¯,
imposes the upper limit on ξ (in the form of a necessary condition) – even though ξ
does not enter (36) directly. Given that 1+α
αξ
is a decreasing function of α, replacing
it with β + 1
2
yields the inequality 1+β+
1
2
(β+ 12)ξ
= 3+2β
(1+2β)ξ
> 1+α
αξ
, which suggests the
following necessary condition for ξ
3 + 2β
(1 + 2β) ξ
> 2⇔ ξ < 3 + 2β
2 (1 + 2β)
<
3
2
(37)
As the final step in this section, let us specify the conditions for the pres-
ence of HS-I and HS-D discrepancies. As to the former, it occurs in the event
of (at least partial) overlap of the orange area in Figure 2 and the blue area in
Figure 3, which is the case when 2ξβ 6 2(ξ−1)
2ξ−1 + 2β. Depending on whether ξ > 1
or otherwise, the last expression becomes either β 6 1
2ξ−1 or β >
1
2ξ−1 , respect-
ively. The latter condition can be omitted though, as it implies that α > 2ξβ =
2ξ
2ξ−1 >
1
2ξ−1 – the latter result is incompatible with the requirements that q˜
∗’s
hump-shapedness is observable: α < 1
ξ “mq−1 <
1
ξm
¯
−1 =
1
2ξ−1 . Thus we can argue
that for HS-D discrepancy to occur, the elasticity of substitution has to exceed
one, and β has to be smaller than 1
2ξ−1 . Given our assumption that ξ > 1/2, the
condition obtained for β is weaker than that required for the observability of q˜∗’s
hump-shapedness (33): q˜∗−hump-shaped⇒ β < 1
2ξ(2ξ−1) <
1
2ξ−1 , which suggests
that whenever q˜∗ is hump-shaped and ξ > 1, HS-D discrepancy is observable
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Figure 4: The HS-D discrepancy region (the hatched area) for ξ = 1.05.
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Figure 5: The HS-D discrepancy region (the hatched area) for ξ = 0.85.
q˜∗ − hump-shaped
ξ > 1
⇒ HS -D discrepancy (38)
In light of the conclusions by Tingvall and Poldahl (2006), we expect condition ξ >
1 to hold for Sweden, and, as suggested by our estimates in Table 1, it is indeed
satisfied for the median estimate of ξ when m = 7.
As regards HS-I discrepancy, we require, in graphic terms, that the orange
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 area in Figure 2 overlap with the red area in Figure 3, which is the case when
β +
1
2
6 β +
√
β2 + 4β
2
⇔ β + 1 6
√
β2 + 4β
β2 + 2β + 1 6 β2 + 4β
β > 1
2
(39)
Given that we consider the situation of HS-I discrepancy, condition (37) of q˜∗’s
hump-shapedness has to hold, so that
ξ < 1 (40)
Note that condition (40) is satisfied for the assessed median values of ξ for France
(see Table 1), where, given the results by Askenazy et al. (2013), we expect HS-I
discrepancy to occur.
Putting together conditions (39) and (40) alongside the stipulation that q˜∗
is hump-shaped, yields the final result
q˜∗ − hump-shaped
β > 1
2
ξ < 1
⇒ HS -I discrepancy (41)
Combining conditions (38) and (41) suggests that, conditional on q˜∗ being
observably hump-shaped, γ˜∗(t) is so as well (and, thus, no discrepancy occurs),
if ξ < 1 and β 6 1
2
.
Having specified the analytical conditions for both HS-D and HS-I discrep-
ancy, we would naturally like to check whether the restrictions imposed on α, β
and ξ are consistent with available pieces of empirical evidence – we address this
question in greater detail in the next section.
3.3 Empirical Plausibility of the Results
In order to check the validity of our theoretical conclusions, we need to
relate α and β to a variable, whose range of values can be inferred from ex-
24
                            26 / 34
 isting empirical literature, and check whether the constraints we impose on the
parameters, are compatible with that range. Our candidate to that end is the
parameter known in the empirical literature as ‘the return on R&D’28 ζ which is
estimated using the following equation29
ln
(
y˜t+1
y˜t
)
= b0 + b1 ln
(
k˜t+1
k˜t
)
+ b2 ln
(
l˜t+1
l˜t
)
+ ζ
γ˜t
y˜t
+ ut (42)
Et
{
ln
(
y˜t+1
y˜t
)
− b1 ln
(
k˜t+1
k˜t
)
− b2 ln
(
l˜t+1
l˜t
)}
= b0 + ζ
γ˜t
y˜t
(43)
where ut is a temporal sequence of independent identically distributed random
variables. Given the model’s parameterisation and the absence of stochasticity
in it, b1 = ν, b2 = 1− ν, which reduces equation (43) to
ln
Qt+1
Qt
= b0 + ζ
γ˜t
y˜t
(44)
Given that discrete data for Qt is generated by Q(t) (i.e., Qt = Q(t) at any
discrete point of time t), we have that Qt+1 = q˜∗Qt.30 Using the definition
of y˜(t), equation (19) can be transformed as follows: q˜∗ 1−(α−β) =
(
γ˜∗(t)
y˜(t)
)α−β
m−β.
Plugging these results into (44) establishes the connection between α and β on
one hand, and ζ on the other
α− β
1− (α− β)
γ˜∗(t)
y˜(t)
− β
1− (α− β)m = b0 + ζ
γ˜∗(t)
y˜(t)
(45)
As follows from (45), α−β
1−(α−β) = ζ ⇔ α − β = ζ1+ζ , which allows us to take
difference α− β to data.
28We use the quotation marks here, as ζ can be interpreted as the return on R&D investment
if R&D effort is assumed to stack up in the form of research capital, which in our model is not
present directly (although one can potentially interpret total factor productivity Q(t) in this
vein) – see (Mairesse and Sassenou, 1991, pp. 2–3) for a detailed discussion.
29(Mairesse and Sassenou, 1991, p. 3).
30To see that, consider two functions At : At+1 = λAt ⇔ At = λtA0 and A′(t) : A˙′(t) =
ωA′(t) ⇔ A′(t) = A′0eωt. Discrete data for At is generated by A′(t) if A0 = A′0 and eω = λ.
With regards to Qt, this implies Qt+1 = eln q˜
∗
Qt = q˜
∗Qt.
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 In a comprehensive survey of ζ’s estimates, Hall, Mairesse, and Mohnen
(2010) list a sufficiently wide range of values for France from 16% to 128%;31
as regards Sweden, we use the estimate of 50.7% from Griffith, Redding, and
Van Reenen (2004).32 These values can support empirically the situations of
both HS-D (Aghion et al. (2005) vs. Tingvall and Poldahl (2006)) and HS-I
(Aghion et al. (2005) vs. Askenazy et al. (2013)) discrepancy. Starting with the
former, condition (38) stipulates that q˜∗ be hump-shaped, and that the elasticity
of substitution be no smaller than one. As regards the former, given (45), it is
satisfied for the values of α such that

α
(α− ζ1+ζ )ξ
> 2
α <
α− ζ
1+ζ
+
√
(α− ζ1+ζ )
2
+4(α− ζ1+ζ )
2
⇔ ζ < α < ζ
1 + ζ
· 2ξ
2ξ − 1 (46)
The set of α’s values is non-empty (or, equivalently, (46) is compatible with
condition (30) for the non-negativity of firms’ profits) when
ζ <
ζ
1 + ζ
· 2ξ
2ξ − 1 ⇔ ζ <
1
2ξ − 1 (47)
The range of ξ’s values prescribed by condition (47) covers the empirical estimate
of ζ for Sweden 50.7%, when 0.507 < 1
2ξ−1 ⇔ ξ < ξ¯ ≈ 1.486. Given that ξ > 1 (as
stated in (38)), the last consideration suggests the range of ξ’s values of (1; 1.486),
which fits our estimate of ξ’s median value for Sweden (form = 7), thus suggesting
that the situation of HS-D discrepancy is compatible with the pieces of empirical
evidence presented.
As to the HS-I discrepancy, we still require q˜∗ to be hump-shaped, so
that condition (47) holds. In addition, given (41), α − β = ζ
1+ζ
> 1
2
⇔ ζ > 1.
Thus, the range of ζ’s suitable values is
(
1; 1
2ξ−1
)
, which, given (41), is non-
empty: ξ < 1 ⇒ 1
2ξ−1 >
1
2−1 = 1. Thereby, so long as ξ < 1, the range obtained
overlaps with the upper tail of the interval of empirical estimates [16%; 128%],
31See (Hall et al., 2010, Tables 2–5) for the full list of estimates for different countries.
32We use the authors’ estimate of return on innovation net of technology transfer contribu-
tion – see (Griffith et al., 2004, Table 3).
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 which confirms the plausibility of the conditions for the HS-I discrepancy as well.
This inference concludes the section.
Conclusion
In this paper we have explored theoretically the possibility of discrepancy
in the behaviour of R&D effort and R&D outcomes (R&D accomplishment) as
functions of competition.
We have shown that, since in the context of their relationship with com-
petition, R&D outcomes and R&D effort are affected by non-identical sets of
factors (viz. escape-costs effect and the depletion (‘fishing-out’) effect for the
former, and direct and indirect escape-costs effects, indirect depletion effect and
the division effect for the latter), the two can exhibit different kinds of detect-
able behaviour: even though both functions are hump-shaped with respect to
the degree of competition m, the turning point of R&D effort can reside outside
the permissible range of m’s values, which makes it observably increasing or ob-
servably decreasing function, thus, coupled with the hump-shapedness of R&D
outcomes, producing observed discrepancy in the behaviour of the two aspects in
innovation with respect to the degree of competition. Conditions imposed on our
model’s parameters in order to generate the discrepancy, seem to comply with
existing ranges of their empirical counterparts’ estimates.
One merit of our approach is that it reconciles the contradictory conclu-
sions drawn in Aghion et al. (2005) on one hand (the presence of the hump-shaped
pattern in the relationship between innovation (measured in terms of R&D out-
comes) and competition) and in Tingvall and Poldahl (2006), Askenazy et al.
(2013) on the other (rejection of the hump-shaped pattern hypothesis in the re-
lationship between innovation, as proxied by R&D effort, and competition).
We hope that our illustration of the possibility that the two aspects of
innovation cannot necessarily be equated to each other (in terms of their rela-
tionships with competition), will inform further attempts to confirm empirically
the hypothesis of the hump-shaped pattern.
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 Appendix A Auxiliary Graphs
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Figure 6: Average quantities of production factors employed, US data.
Data source: Feenstra et al. (2015).
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Figure 7: Percentage changes in TFP levels, US data.
Data sources: Feenstra et al. (2015), Jarmin and Miranda (2002)
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